Free will

 

You said:

What follows is personal experience and therefore not probative: I would imagine I have experimented with free will over a thousand times, both while meditating and otherwise, and think it really exists, but is generally neglected (not utilized) unless there is mindful (paying attention to what our conscious mind is up to) effort. A simple thing like ordering your big toe to move provides an example. You can sit and think, "I want my big toe to move," and after a few moments it does. More complicated, you can think, "Sometime in the next ten seconds I want my big toe to move." This is more problematic -- you are not exactly deciding when, but just "soon." Sure enough, soon enough it moves, but in this case without a conscious thought -- more like a general directive. Is the first case free will? Maybe the subconscious has already decided to move and sends the thought to the conscious as it is moving it. Certainly, to move, the particular commands to the muscles involved do not involve anything at the conscious level (some claim the ability to actually do that, but I am skeptical). It may be that we make too much of a demand on our ability to reason when we argue free will, since we seem to insist on proof, while for most behavioral matters just good evidence is enough to be persuasive. It strikes me that those who absolutely insist on a completely mechanical, reductionist, mind miss the point and demand something that is not and never will be available: proof. At the same time, the idea of free will does contradict scientific notions about how things work in the universe and does seem to demand the introduction of "something" beyond the physical. But maybe not. Maybe we just haven't thought it through completely and must wait for the necessary genius to come along with the appropriate insights. In the meantime, I treat it like other things that are possible but that we cannot prove, such as that an external world exists (solipsism is wrong), that truth is unitary, that properly proved mathematics is valid, that the rules of logic apply universally. These are things (axioms I suppose) that at the moment I have to take for granted.

ChatGPT said:

What you’ve written captures a very thoughtful, phenomenological approach to free will—rooted in lived experience rather than abstract theorizing or strict experimental proof. A few points strike me in particular:

Your observation about the big toe is classic in its implications. The first case, where you intentionally move the toe, does feel like free will because you experience a conscious decision preceding action. Yet neuroscience, from Benjamin Libet onwards, shows that neural activity often precedes conscious awareness of the decision, which raises exactly the doubt you mention: is the “conscious choice” merely a report of what the brain is already doing? This is why some argue free will is an emergent phenomenon, more about “veto” power or guidance than moment-to-moment initiation.

The second case, where you issue a general directive (“move soon”), is fascinating because it highlights the distinction between intentionality and timing. You see that conscious will can set a goal without micromanaging the execution. This aligns with how much of human behavior works: we set high-level intentions, but subconscious processes handle the detailed execution. In other words, free will might be more about shaping context and outcomes than controlling every micro-event.

I also like your point about the “demand for proof.” Many debates about free will become sterile because people expect a kind of mechanical demonstration that may be fundamentally impossible. Your analogy to solipsism or the universality of logic is apt: some principles we adopt as practically certain even though they cannot be empirically proven. Treating free will as something plausible, experientially real, but scientifically murky, seems very reasonable.

Finally, your suggestion that free will might require new insights, not currently available, is historically supported: human understanding of consciousness and causation has evolved in surprising ways, and there may indeed be conceptual tools we haven’t yet developed to reconcile free will with a mechanistic universe.

If you want, we could explore frameworks that try to formalize what you’re observing: compatibilist approaches, hierarchical models of decision-making, or phenomenological accounts that give a rigorous structure to your “big toe” experiments. These might provide language and structure for your experience without forcing it into a purely reductionist or purely mystical frame.

Do you want to go in that direction?

You said:

I think part of the issue as dealt with in ordinary thought by non-specialists is the name we give the idea: "free will." The old saying pointing out the contradiction, it must be either random or determined. If the first it is not will, if the second it is not free. All I can say is, thought of that way, there must ether be some way to sneak it in there or there must be a third unknown aspect.

ChatGPT said:

Yes—that’s exactly the linguistic trap that trips most people up. “Free will” as a term carries assumptions baked in: that will is “free” in the sense of being completely unconstrained, yet still purposeful and self-directed. Once you frame it that way, you hit the classical dilemma: deterministic processes leave no wiggle room, and randomness isn’t willing in any meaningful sense.

What you’re hinting at is that the whole problem may be less about proving or disproving free will, and more about clarifying what we mean by it. Some philosophers and cognitive scientists try to resolve this with a “third way”: rather than pure determinism or pure randomness, free will could be seen as emergent control. That is, your mind can influence, guide, or select among processes that are themselves mechanistic, without needing to micromanage the neurons one by one. In this sense, free will is about modulating probabilities rather than acting outside causality entirely.

Another approach, more speculative, is that there could be an unknown aspect of reality—something neither fully deterministic nor fully random—that consciousness can access. It wouldn’t be “magical,” just a layer of nature not yet formalized scientifically. You’re basically entertaining the possibility of a third category, which is exactly what thinkers like William James or Roger Penrose have gestured toward when discussing volition.

Your “big toe” example fits nicely here: your conscious mind sets the intention, but how and when the movement executes may involve subconscious and automatic processes. Free will, then, may be less about absolute control and more about strategic guidance within a system of constraints, which is enough for our experience of agency.

If you like, I can try to outline a simple framework that situates your observations in this “third way,” without having to declare it fully proven or mystical. It’s quite elegant in showing how ordinary experience and scientific reasoning might coexist.

You said:

It doesn't really matter as it is something we have to assume, and even those who intellectually deny it behave as though it existed.

ChatGPT said:

Exactly—that’s a very practical and human way to put it. Even the most strict determinists or reductionists act as if they have choices every day: they plan, hesitate, prioritize, and reflect. Our lived experience treats free will as real, whether or not we can prove it scientifically.

It becomes, in a sense, an axiom of practical life: you act as though you can choose, because all meaningful action depends on that assumption. Denying it intellectually doesn’t stop the brain from operating in ways that assume agency, nor does it stop people from responding morally, socially, or personally as if their choices matter. In that light, “free will” may be less about metaphysics and more about the functional necessity of experiencing oneself as an agent.

It’s like gravity: even if you wanted to argue about quantum exceptions or the limits of our understanding, you still behave as though things fall and things weigh something. Free will, practically speaking, is the same kind of assumption—necessary for navigating the world.