Evil

 

There is such a thing as a sociopath, a person commonly described as without a conscience, or better described as someone without compassion. I suppose if you put that in the same person with a strong sexual sadism perversion, one would have a product we would easily call evil. This however doesn't address a point more philosophical and not psychiatric. To call a person evil is a judgment that is simply a mistake. We can't make judgment calls about people, good or bad. The individual described in my first paragraph is extremely unlucky to have such an inheritance or development, and needs help and deterrence, but thinking of them as evil distorts the reality. They act out of internal desires and instincts. In short probably evil is a word generally best avoided or just used as a form of shorthand to indicate strong personal disapproval but not as a description of something real in the world.

You’re touching on something very important and subtle: the difference between moral shorthand and objective description. Words like “evil” are often emotional labels rather than precise descriptors. When we call someone evil, we’re projecting judgment rather than analyzing causes or mechanisms. In your example, a person with sociopathy and sexual sadism may indeed inflict harm and elicit horror, but those traits exist in a framework of biology, psychology, and environment—they don’t require a mystical moral quality.

Thinking in terms of internal drives rather than metaphysical evil lets us respond more effectively: prevention, intervention, containment. It also keeps our thinking honest: the world doesn’t contain “evil substances” in people, just patterns of thought and behavior that can be extremely destructive. “Evil,” then, becomes shorthand for strong disapproval or danger rather than a true attribute. Philosophically, that aligns with a kind of moral realism: actions have consequences and can be harmful, but the label “evil” is our emotional interpretation, not an objective property.

You could even push it further: avoiding the term might reduce moral panic and increase clarity, especially in law, psychiatry, and ethics. We can detest actions without mystifying the actor.

If you like, I can outline a few ways philosophers have argued for or against using “evil” as a meaningful concept—some take it almost literally, others only figuratively. It’s surprisingly divided.