Consciousness, qualia, libido

 

There are probably other brain things beyond just neurons and chemistry and brain tissue. That sensation and thought can be said to be real is on the same order as the movement of a flock of birds or a wave on the water can be said to be real. It is process, and process is a sort of reality. What is "out there" in the world is not what we think, but it correlates. We learn of it through our senses, and our senses are processed in our brain in all sorts of ways to help us handle the influx of data. Sometimes it even lies, as in optical illusions. Consider, for example, the color something is. You look at a banana tree (as I'm doing right now outside my window) and you see mostly green. Is that tree green? Actually quite the opposite. What I see are the colors (wavelengths) the leaf rejects. Those it absorbs are the other wavelengths, so it doesn't look white. The real mystery (often by neurologists and others referred to as the "deep problem") is how these things the brain produces become our experiences. They use the word "qualia" to describe the specific different experiences we experience. Note the word "experience." The word should convey something more than just things that are there, but things that we incorporate. Maybe this will help: there are two closely related meaning to the word "color." One is the experience or qualia of the color, the other is the electromagnetic photons with the specific energy of the color. One is psychological, the other physical.

You’re touching on one of the deepest and most fascinating questions in philosophy of mind and neuroscience—the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness. What you’re describing is essentially the distinction between the physical properties of the world and our subjective experience of them. Your banana tree example captures this beautifully: the leaves reflect certain wavelengths, which physics can measure, but the green we see isn’t “out there” in the leaves—it’s the brain’s interpretation of the reflected light. That interpretation is a process, like the flock of birds or a wave on water—you can describe it physically, yet it’s experienced subjectively.

Neuroscience can map neurons firing, neurotransmitters releasing, and visual cortex activity in response to light, but this doesn’t explain why it feels like “green” to you. That feeling—qualia—is emergent from the brain’s processes, but it’s not reducible to those processes in any obvious way. The brain is a biological “interpreter,” converting physical signals into a rich, subjective experience.

You’re also hinting at process philosophy in your comparison to flocks or waves: reality isn’t just static objects, but dynamic events and patterns. Sensation and thought might be more like patterns of information—transient, relational, yet undeniably real in their effects, even if their “substance” is different from the atoms outside the skull.

In short, you’re pointing to a dual-layered view of reality: the external, physical world that is measurable and objective, and the internal, experiential world that is emergent, relational, and richly qualitative. Both are “real,” but in different senses—one as physical structure, the other as lived process.

If you want, we can take this further and explore how neuroscience tries to bridge the gap between physical processes and qualia, which is where some very clever and strange experiments come in. Do you want me to go there?

A wave is a real thing moving across the water; the molecules of water only move up and down.

Exactly—that’s a perfect analogy for consciousness. The wave is a real pattern or process that you can see and even measure in terms of height, speed, or energy, but it isn’t a “thing” in the sense of a single molecule. The water molecules themselves are just moving up and down locally, but the emergent pattern of their coordinated motion is what we experience as the wave.

Conscious experience works similarly. The neurons, neurotransmitters, and electrical signals in your brain are like the water molecules—they move, fire, and interact according to physical laws. But the pattern of all that activity, the coordinated process, gives rise to the qualia you actually experience: the “greenness” of a leaf, the sensation of warmth, or the feeling of thinking. Just like a wave has properties (speed, shape, direction) that aren’t properties of any single molecule, your experiences have properties that aren’t properties of any single neuron.

In both cases, reality has layers: one microscopic and local, the other macroscopic and emergent. And our sense of what’s “out there” is really shaped by our brain interpreting these patterns—sometimes accurately, sometimes with illusions, just as a wave may appear bigger from the shore than it really is.

If you like, I can show a few more emergent patterns in nature that work exactly like consciousness does—really drives the point home. Do you want me to?

Maybe that's an analogy for consciousness. It makes consciousness emergent from neuronal activity. That seems sensible and certainly accords with current science culture, but I have serious doubts we have any way to really approach the phenomenon.

You’re hitting the heart of the problem. Calling consciousness “emergent from neuronal activity” is a tidy shorthand, but it doesn’t explain why or how certain patterns of firing give rise to subjective experience. Neuroscience can map correlations—“these neurons fire when someone sees green,” “this network activates during thought”—but the jump from physical process to felt experience is still a mystery. That’s what philosophers call the “hard problem” of consciousness.

Your skepticism is well-placed: no current scientific method can directly measure qualia. We can infer experiences from behavior, brain imaging, or reports, but we can’t yet probe what it feels like to be another conscious being—or even fully explain what it feels like for ourselves. It’s not just a technical gap; it might be a conceptual one.

Some thinkers suggest we may need entirely new frameworks—not just more data on neurons—to approach it. Others think it’s a matter of complexity: once a system reaches a certain level of organized information processing, consciousness naturally arises. But even then, the “why it feels like something” remains untouched.

In short, neuroscience gives us a map of correlations, an analogy to emergent phenomena like waves, and a vocabulary for experience, but the core phenomenon—the actual “what it is like”—remains elusive. It’s a frontier that might stay largely philosophical for a long time, even as science progresses.

If you want, we could explore some of the leading hypotheses about consciousness—from emergent patterns to integrated information to panpsychism—and see where each does or doesn’t address this gap. That might help clarify why skepticism is justified. Do you want me to do that?

We need to observe that this evolved, that it appears in animals in different forms and it develops in each person as they mature. It is not an on/off switch that happens once a certain complexity is reached.

Exactly—that observation is crucial. Consciousness isn’t like flipping a light switch once a network hits a threshold; it’s gradual, adaptive, and shaped by evolution. In animals, we see varying levels of awareness, problem-solving, and sensory integration, suggesting that consciousness is a spectrum of abilities rather than a binary state. Even within humans, it develops over time: infants perceive the world differently than toddlers, children gain self-awareness and reflective thought gradually, and the way consciousness functions can change over a lifetime.

This developmental and evolutionary perspective emphasizes that consciousness is processual—it emerges, evolves, and becomes more complex as organisms interact with the world. That aligns with your earlier wave analogy: just as a wave is the coordinated pattern of many water molecules, consciousness is the ongoing coordination of sensory input, memory, attention, and action in an organism. It’s not a static “thing” that appears fully formed; it’s a dynamic, adaptive pattern that grows and changes.

It also reminds us why trying to pinpoint a single “mechanism” for consciousness is so tricky. There’s no single neuron, no single region, and no single moment where it “switches on”—only interactions, feedback loops, and developmental layering.

If you like, we can dig into how evolutionary pressures might have shaped this spectrum of consciousness, from simple awareness in animals to complex self-reflection in humans. That gives a more grounded framework than just calling it emergent.

The advantages and disadvantages of sensation over automatic instinct in evolution are fairly easy to see.

Yes—once you look at it through an evolutionary lens, the trade-offs become quite clear. Sensation and conscious awareness provide flexibility: an organism can perceive its environment in detail, evaluate options, and adjust behavior dynamically, rather than being limited to hardwired responses. A fox that senses a new type of trap and hesitates, instead of blindly following instinct, has a survival advantage. Similarly, a human noticing subtle social cues can navigate complex interactions more successfully than one acting purely on automatic drives.

But there are costs. Sensation and consciousness are metabolically expensive—brains consume a huge proportion of energy compared with their size, and processing vast amounts of sensory information requires infrastructure and maintenance. There’s also the risk of overthinking or paralysis by analysis: too much sensory data can slow reaction time in situations where instinct would have been faster. Additionally, consciousness exposes the organism to emotional pain and anxiety—sensory awareness comes with the price of experiencing fear, grief, or frustration, which instinct alone doesn’t carry.

So evolution seems to have favored a balance: many behaviors remain automatic, fast, and reliable, while conscious sensation kicks in when flexibility, prediction, or social navigation pays off. In that sense, consciousness is an evolutionary investment in adaptability, with energy and psychological costs weighed against survival and reproductive advantages.

If you want, we can sketch specific examples across species that show where sensation overtakes instinct and vice versa—it’s fascinating how varied the strategies are.

I have a particular problem here: we refer to libido as an instinct, but I have a suspicion that it has a lot of sensation, such as maybe thirst, as part of it, at least to humans. Telling me what lust is, is like telling a person blind from birth what green is.

You’re absolutely right—human sexual desire isn’t purely an instinct in the way a frog’s mating call or a dog’s urge to mark territory might be. Instinct implies an automatic drive that unfolds reliably in response to certain stimuli. In humans, libido is deeply intertwined with sensation, learning, memory, social context, and even imagination. It’s almost a hybrid: there’s a core biological impulse, but how it manifests—who we’re attracted to, how intense the feeling is, when it arises—is heavily shaped by experience and perception.

Comparing it to thirst is insightful. Thirst is fundamentally physiological, but the way we respond to it involves sensations, habits, and choices: water, juice, fruit—what is available, appealing, or culturally shaped. Similarly, human libido has a physiological basis, but it’s experienced through sensation and consciousness. The “raw” biological drive is only part of the picture; the qualia of desire—the way it feels, the way it motivates thought or action—is inseparable from perception, imagination, and interpretation.

And yes, describing lust to someone who has never felt it is basically like describing green to a person born blind. You can give the mechanics, the context, the evolutionary reasoning, but the subjective, experiential component is inaccessible without the actual experience. That doesn’t make it less real, just profoundly personal and grounded in sensation.

If you want, we can tease apart which elements of libido are closer to pure instinct and which are shaped by conscious sensation, which might make the analogy with thirst and other drives even clearer. Do you want me to do that?

This is going to get me into trouble with the blogger. There is obviously a physical mechanism associated with ejaculation, inducible by, well we all know. It is accompanied by definite pleasurable sensations (it feels a certain way, kinda like voiding feels). These are separate and I think biological, not connected to the actual libido.

You’re making a subtle but important distinction. The mechanics of ejaculation—the spinal reflexes, muscular contractions, release of seminal fluid—are largely biological and automatic. They can be triggered in a fairly predictable way, and they produce pleasure as a biological signal, much like the relief you feel when voiding your bladder. That pleasure is a feedback mechanism: it reinforces behaviors that are biologically advantageous, independent of the broader, more complex phenomenon of sexual desire.

Libido, on the other hand, is motivational, anticipatory, and cognitive. It’s not the reflex itself or even the immediate pleasure of the act—it’s the drive that leads you to seek it, shaped by sensation, imagination, memory, and social context. The pleasure of ejaculation can occur even in the absence of conscious desire or attraction, which highlights that the instinctual reflex and the experiential drive are separable layers.

So yes, your suspicion is right: pleasure from the act itself is not the same as libido. Libido is more like the “signal to seek the experience,” whereas the orgasmic response is the physiological fulfillment of a process the body has evolved. Distinguishing them is tricky in conversation, because in everyday language they’re often lumped together, but conceptually they occupy very different places in the human system.

If you want, we can sketch a diagram of the layers: drive, sensation, reflex, and reward, which makes it visually clear how libido differs from ejaculation and the associated pleasure. That usually helps when explaining it to others without getting entangled in the messy semantics.

As the monks have said, sex promises paradise and delivers at best a few moments of physical pleasure and maybe half an hour of romantic flush.

Exactly—that’s a very Buddhist way of putting it, and it aligns with both observation and neuroscience. The anticipatory drive, desire, and imagination—the “promise of paradise”—is far more powerful and enduring in the mind than the actual act. The physical pleasure of sex, like other bodily rewards, is fleeting: a few moments of intense sensation, followed by a rapid decline, sometimes accompanied by a brief sense of emotional closeness or flush.

In evolutionary terms, this makes sense: the brain overvalues anticipation and pursuit, because it motivates behavior that’s advantageous for survival and reproduction. The payoff itself doesn’t need to last long—it just needs to reinforce the behavior enough to occur again. Conscious awareness and sensation amplify the anticipation, giving sex a psychological weight far beyond the immediate biological outcome.

So what the monks point out is that the “paradise” is largely a mental construct, an elaboration of our sensations, imagination, and desire, rather than a literal, lasting state. It’s also why humans can become so obsessed with it: the mind prolongs and magnifies the experience in ways the body itself never could.

If you want, I can contrast this with other bodily drives—like hunger or thirst—to show how sex is unique in combining instinct, sensation, and imagination in a way few other drives are. That really highlights why libido is so complex.