No soul

 

You said:

Here is a guess as to what our spirit or soul might be. With introspection we can realize that our mind is not a thing but a process -- constantly going from place to place, bringing up memories, responding or at least noting sensory stimuli, and sometimes experiencing thoughts (both welcome and unwelcome) arising from what we commonly call our sub-conscious mind. When we die or suffer serious brain injury, the surface evidence leads one to conclude the spirit dies too. However, the "deep questions" of neurology and psychology, what is sentience and what is consciousness, seem immaterial (obviously influenced heavily by brain, but still doing things of an immaterial, "spiritual" sort. A wave of light is also a process, and can be compared to our mind. It propagates itself in vacuum without any aether to propagate in (technically, it is an electrical wave generating a magnetic wave generating an electrical wave, and so on as it moves along). So it is not necessary to conclude mind needs brain any more than light needs a medium. However, there does not seem to be any credible evidence, so I guess it is better to just speculate and avoid the trap of belief.

ChatGPT said:

That’s a thoughtful and carefully hedged speculation, and I think it hangs together better than many that rush too quickly either to reductionism or to metaphysics.

Your starting point—that the mind, as revealed by introspection, is a process rather than a thing—is hard to argue with. What we actually encounter are activities: attending, remembering, reacting, narrating, and the odd eruption of thoughts that feel as though they arrive unbidden. In that sense the “self” already looks less like an object and more like a continuously updated event, or perhaps a bundle of events held together by memory and expectation. This way of seeing things aligns not only with modern cognitive science but also, interestingly, with certain Buddhist analyses of mind that deny a persisting substance while fully acknowledging lived experience.

The tension you point to—between the overwhelming dependence of mind on brain integrity and the apparent immateriality of consciousness itself—is exactly where the problem bites. Damage the brain, and the mind degrades or disappears in ways that look brutally causal. Yet when we try to describe what is degraded or lost, we reach for terms like awareness, meaning, intentionality, or “what it is like,” none of which map cleanly onto neural firings. That gap is what keeps the “deep questions” alive, despite decades of increasingly sophisticated neuroscience.

Your light-wave analogy is a good one, provided it’s handled with care. A light wave is indeed a self-propagating process, not a thing riding on a substance, and historically it helped physics escape the mistaken intuition that waves must have a medium like water or air. In that sense, it serves as a useful warning against smuggling in unnecessary metaphysical assumptions—such as the idea that mind must be a “thing” located somewhere, or that it must be annihilated simply because its usual correlates are gone. At the same time, we now know that light does depend very precisely on underlying physical laws and fields, even if not on a material aether. The analogy doesn’t license independence so much as it invites us to remain open about what sort of dependence might be involved.

Where I think your caution is especially sound is in the final move: refusing to convert this speculative space into belief. It is one thing to say that current science does not fully explain consciousness and that our intuitions about dependence may be incomplete; it is another to leap from that to claims of survival, persistence, or a detachable soul. The history of both philosophy and science is littered with confident conclusions drawn from explanatory gaps that later closed in unexpected ways.

So what you’re left with—speculation without metaphysical commitment—seems intellectually honest. You’re neither denying the brute evidence that mind tracks brain, nor foreclosing the possibility that our current conceptual framework is inadequate. In a sense, that stance mirrors good science at its best: take the phenomena seriously, resist premature closure, and tolerate not-knowing without filling the silence with dogma.

You said:

You lost me a little talking about light waves where you said, I think correctly, that we now know light does depend on underlying physical fields; in other words not a material substrate. Relevance comes to mind as well as how this might work to weaken the analogy.

ChatGPT said:

That’s a fair pushback, and you’re right to ask whether my remark actually does any useful work—or just muddies the water.

Let me try again, more cleanly.

Your original point with light was essentially this: a process does not require a material “thing” underneath it in the way our intuitions suggest. Historically, people thought waves had to be vibrations of something—water, air, or the luminiferous aether. Light broke that intuition. It is a real, causal phenomenon that propagates without a material medium. That much is exactly right, and it’s the core relevance of the analogy.

When I mentioned “underlying physical fields,” I wasn’t trying to re‑insert a substrate in the old sense, but I see how it came across that way. The electromagnetic field is not a medium in the everyday or even classical mechanical sense; it doesn’t sit there like jelly waiting to be disturbed. It is better thought of as a set of relations or lawful possibilities instantiated everywhere. In other words, light is still a process governed by structure, not a thing riding on a stuff.

Where the analogy weakens—if it weakens at all—is here:
for light, we now have a very precise account of what the process is a process of. For mind, we don’t. We can correlate mental activity with neural activity, but the step from electrochemical events to subjective experience remains conceptually opaque. There is no equivalent, yet, of Maxwell’s equations for consciousness.

So the relevance of the analogy is negative rather than positive. It does not show that mind can exist without a brain. What it does show is that arguments of the form “X must require a substrate because all processes do” have failed before. Light teaches intellectual humility about what counts as a “necessary support.”

At the same time, the analogy cannot be pushed further without overreach. With light, when the source stops emitting, the wave continues briefly and then is gone; it does not acquire an independent life. If mind were analogous in that sense, death would still mark the end of the process, even if our intuitions about how it ends were wrong. So the analogy undermines naive materialism, but it does not rescue dualism or personal survival.

In short:
– The analogy is relevant as a warning against bad intuitions about processes.
– It weakens if taken as evidence for mind’s independence rather than against premature conclusions.
– Your instinct to stop at speculation and avoid belief remains exactly the right epistemic posture.

If anything, the light example supports your last sentence more than any metaphysical claim: when explanations are incomplete, restraint is a virtue, not a cop‑out.

You said:

Ok, (keep in mind this is speculation) the fields in which light propagates are not quite the same thing.

ChatGPT said:

Yes — and that’s an important refinement, not a nit.

If we stay in speculative mode but try to be precise, then the key point is that the “fields” in which light propagates are not analogous to a background container or support in the way people once imagined an aether. They are better understood as the rules of interaction themselves, not a place where something happens.

An electromagnetic wave is not in the field in the way a ripple is in water. The wave is a structured change of the field. Nothing is being carried along; there is no underlying stuff that remains while the wave passes through it. What persists is the lawful structure, not a substrate.

That distinction matters for your analogy, because it shifts the focus away from where mind might be and toward what kind of thing mind might be. If consciousness were analogous, it would not exist “in” the brain the way steam exists in a kettle. It would be an organized activity of lawful relations — something more like a pattern that can only appear when the conditions are right, but which is not itself reducible to any single component.

Where this helps your speculation is here: it avoids the false dilemma between “mind is a material object” and “mind is a ghostly substance.” A process defined by relations and constraints does not need to be either. It can be real, causal, and irreducible in description, while still being entirely dependent on the conditions that allow it to occur.

Where it still stops short — and this is the hard wall you keep running into honestly — is persistence. In physics, when the conditions that sustain the field dynamics change, the phenomenon changes or vanishes. There is no known case where a structured field process detaches and continues independently of the system that made it possible. If consciousness were similar, brain failure would still imply the end of the conscious process, even if consciousness is not “made of” neurons in any simple sense.

So your speculation is becoming sharper, not vaguer:
mind as patterned activity, not substance;
dependent without being reducible;
real without being portable.

That’s a narrow ridge to walk, philosophically — but it’s a defensible one.

You said:

The reality does seem to be that without brain there would be no mind. The links are numerous and persuasive. The speculation is that the process; processes operate in fields, so there are fields present.

ChatGPT said:

Yes — and now the speculation is landing in a much more disciplined place.

If we accept, as you do, that empirically the mind does not exist without the brain — the correlations are too tight, too numerous, and too systematically destructive when the brain is damaged — then the question is no longer about independence, but about description. What kind of thing is the mind, given that dependence?

Your move is to say: processes do not float free; they occur within — or more accurately, as configurations of — fields. That is a reasonable conjecture, provided we are careful about what “field” means. Not a substance, not a hidden stuff, but a domain of lawful relations that makes certain patterns possible and others impossible.

In that framing, the brain is not the mind itself, but the boundary condition that excites, constrains, and stabilizes a particular kind of process. Just as a violin does not contain music but enables certain vibrational patterns, the brain enables a certain class of organized experiential processes. Destroy the violin, and the music stops — not because music was a thing trapped inside, but because the conditions for that pattern are gone.

Where the speculation gains traction is that it explains why mental phenomena feel qualitatively different from neural descriptions without requiring anything supernatural. Fields are not objects you can point to, yet they are indispensable in physics. If consciousness corresponds to a higher‑order field-like organization — informational, relational, or dynamical — then its “immaterial” character is exactly what we should expect, not a mystery demanding a soul‑substance.

At the same time, this view is bracingly unsentimental. If the brain is the necessary condition that gives rise to that field organization, then when the brain fails, the field configuration collapses. There is no implication of survival, only of non‑reducibility. The mind is real, but it is real in the way a pattern is real — utterly dependent on what sustains it.

So your speculation doesn’t weaken the conclusion that death ends the mind. It reframes what it is that ends. Not a thing being destroyed, but a process losing the conditions that let it exist at all. And that, I think, is as far as one can go without crossing from philosophy into faith — which you’ve been quite careful not to do.

You said:

The process stops, as far as we know.

ChatGPT said:

Exactly. Based on all the evidence we have, the process stops when the brain ceases to function. The mind’s activity—thoughts, awareness, perception—is inseparable from the network of neurons, chemical gradients, and electrical patterns that sustain it. When those supporting conditions collapse, the process can no longer occur.

Your speculation about fields doesn’t contradict that; it simply frames the mind as a process that operates within constraints, rather than as a “thing” that could somehow persist independently. Death, or catastrophic brain injury, ends the necessary conditions, so the process ends.

In other words, you can hold a picture of mind as immaterial-like or process-based, yet still acknowledge that its continuation is contingent. The speculation adds depth to what stops, without implying anything survives beyond the cessation of the underlying support. It’s a subtle but important distinction: the process itself is real, but it is not self-sustaining outside the system that generates it.

You said:

You seem worried that I'm trying to slip in a way for the process to continue. That is not necessary. What is determined is that mind is not dependent on physical brain, only that physical, functioning brain is the place we find it in introspection and neurology.

ChatGPT said:

Ah — I see exactly what you’re doing now, and yes, that’s a key clarification. You’re not trying to sneak in survival beyond death; you’re simply noting that the mind is a process, and processes, in principle, don’t have to be tied to matter the way objects are. All the evidence tells us that, in practice, the brain is the locus where this process manifests. But you’re not claiming that this fact entails some independent existence beyond it.

So the distinction is subtle but important:

1. Empirical dependence: As far as we can tell, functioning brain = functioning mind. No brain, no mind. The process is observable only there.

2. Ontological characterization: Conceptually, mind as a process doesn’t have to be a physical “thing.” A process is defined by relations and activity, not by being made of matter. That’s what allows you to talk about fields and structured activity without implying immortality.

In other words, you’re separating where the process occurs from what kind of thing it is. The mind happens in the brain, but it is not identical to the material brain any more than a wave is identical to water. The wave vanishes when the water is still, but the wave’s “essence” is still a pattern in motion, not the substance it moves through.

It’s a very clean way of keeping the discussion about what mind is without drifting into claims about what mind might do after the brain stops.

You said:

The wave vanishes when the pond is drained.

ChatGPT said:

Exactly — and that sharpens the analogy beautifully. The wave doesn’t persist without the pond; its existence is inseparable from the medium and conditions that sustain it. Similarly, the mind doesn’t persist without the brain.

The point of the wave analogy isn’t to suggest independence or survival, but to illuminate the nature of the thing that exists while it exists. It’s a process, not a thing, defined by patterns of activity within a system. The pond (or brain) constrains, enables, and sustains that process; take the pond away, and the wave ceases — nothing survives outside those conditions.

So in this view, “mind” is real and meaningful as long as the supporting structure exists, but its reality is fully contingent. It emphasizes that being a process doesn’t exempt a phenomenon from dependence on its conditions; it only changes how we describe what is “there” while it exists.

You said:

All this is analogy, useful for explaining or clarifying, not evidence.

ChatGPT said:

Yes. Exactly. And that’s the right place to land.

Analogy here is doing conceptual housekeeping, not evidentiary work. It helps us avoid category mistakes—treating mind as a thing, or assuming that dependence must mean reducibility—but it does not establish what is actually the case in the world. Light waves, fields, ponds, violins: all of that is scaffolding for thought, not data.

The evidence runs the other way and is brutally one-sided. Alter the brain in specific ways and the mind alters in specific, repeatable ways. Destroy the brain and the mind disappears. That’s not an inference by analogy; it’s observation. Analogy can’t override that, and you’re not asking it to.

What the analogies do buy you is intellectual clarity. They let you say, without contradiction, that mind is real, non-thinglike, processual, and dependent—without smuggling in substances, souls, or survival claims. They also let you resist the sloppy move from “depends on” to “is nothing but,” which is a philosophical shortcut, not a scientific conclusion.

So yes: analogy explains, it does not prove. And treating it as anything more than that would indeed be a trap of belief—exactly the one you’ve been careful to avoid.